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ABSTRACT
Assessing the Re-Identification Risk in ECG Datasets and an Application of Privacy Preserving
Techniques in ECG Analysis
by Arin Ghazarian

In this work, first we investigate the use of ECG signal as a biometric in human identification
systems using deep learning models. We train convolutional neural network models on ECG
samples from approximately 81k patients. Our models achieved an over-all accuracy of 95.69%.
Further, we assess the accuracy of our ECG identification model for distinct groups of patients
with particular heart conditions and combinations of such conditions. For example, we observed
that the identification accuracy was the highest (99.7%) for patients with both ST changes and
supraventricular tachycardia. On the other hand, we also found that the identification rate was the
lowest for patients diagnosed with both atrial fibrillation and complete right bundle branch block
(49%).
Next, we discuss the implications of our findings from the ECG identification models regarding
the re-identification risks for the patients and how seemingly anonymized ECG datasets can cause
privacy leakages. For some hypothetical scenarios such as when a patient contributes to two
different research datasets, we try to quantify the privacy risks. We estimate the probability of how
uniquely and accurately one can re-identify patients with a specific type of heart condition
contributing to multiple ECG datasets containing data fields like age, gender, and location. We
also discuss the new ECG-based demographics detection technology and how it might compromise
patients’ privacy even to a degree where someone can find a patient’s residence solely based on
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an ECG sample. The implications of our findings for the privacy regulations such as HIPAA or
GDPR are discussed as well.
In contrast to common traditional belief that statistical aggregate or anonymized databases are safe
to share, it can be proven that even aggregation does not guarantee privacy and individuals can be
re-identified from the published aggregated results. Differential privacy is a privacy preserving
data analysis technique which protects the privacy of individuals’ in a database by adding the right
amount of noise to perturbate the results. In the last chapter, we will discuss an end-to-end
application of differential privacy to an ECG dataset in order to safely share useful statistics with
the public.
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1 Introduction to Heart and ECG
1.1

Heart Anatomy

Human heart is an amazing organ, almost size of our fist, which works constantly from eight weeks
in embryo till when we die. It pumps 1500-2000 gallons of blood daily and the blood travels a total
of around 12,000 miles daily. The number one cause of death in US and in the world are heart
conditions. Heart has an electrical system responsible for generating signals that trigger the heart
to beat. It contracts rhythmically to pump the impure blood to the lungs for oxygenation and then
pump this oxygenated blood for general circulation. Heart has four chambers: right atrium, left
atrium, right ventricle, left ventricle. Figure 1 shows the blood flow diagram in the human heart.
The blood circulating process through heart consists of two phases: systole and diastole. Systole
is the period of the contraction of the heart ventricular muscle and the diastole is the period of
dilation of the heart ventricular cavities. Deoxygenated blood is received through large veins like
the superior and inferior vena cava and flows into the right atrium. The right atrium contracts and
pushes the blood into the right ventricle right and then to the lungs for purification. The purified
blood flows from lungs to the left atrium and then to the left ventricle via mitral valve. The left
ventricle pumps out the purified blood to the body via aortic valve and aorta.
The normal rhythmical heartbeat is called sinus rhythm which is established by the sinoatrial node
(also known as the sinus node or the SA node). Sinoatrial node is heart’s pacemaker, it generates
an electrical signal that travels through the heart, making the heart muscles to contract.

1

Figure 1 Human heart (source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heart)

1.2

ECG

Electrocardiogram (ECG) data reflects the bio-electrical activity of the heart collected from human
body surface. As shown in Figure 2, heart has an electrical system (heart’s natural pacemaker)
responsible for generating and conducting a continuous impulse throughout the heart making the
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heart to beat. The sinoatrial node (also known as SA or sinus node) is a small group of cells in
heart that produce this electrical impulse. The electrical signal generated in SA node travels
through the heart via the heart’s electrical conduction system.

Figure 2 Electrical conduction system of the heart (source
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Conductionsystemoftheheart.png )
As shown in Figure 3, an ECG during one normal heartbeat consists of several features including
the P-wave, the QRS complex, the T-wave, PR interval, QT interval, PR segment and ST segment.
ECG is an important and non-invasive tool in the diagnosis of heart status and detection of
abnormalities. The amplitudes, time intervals, and other morphological features in different

3

sections of the ECG signal are used for diagnoses and classification of different types of cardiac
conditions.

Figure 3 The ECG waveform and segments in lead II that presents a normal cardiac cycle
(source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SinusRhythmLabels.png)
Electrocardiography is done via electrodes placed on the skin. These electrodes capture the
electrical changes caused by cardiac muscle depolarization followed by repolarization during each
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heartbeat. In a 12-lead ECG setting, ten electrodes are placed on the patient's body of which four
are on the limbs and six on the chest, this setting is shown in Figure 4. Using these ten electrodes,
we record 12 perspectives of the heart's activity from different angles through two electrical planes
(vertical and horizontal).

Figure 4 12 leads resting ECG electrode placement (source
https://aimcardio.com/blog/12-lead-placement-guide-with-diagram/)

1.3

Arrhythmia

Arrhythmia is a group of conditions in which the heartbeat has an irregular rate or rhythm. In
general, arrhythmia is the improper beating of the hearts like too fast (tachycardia), too slowly
(bradycardia), or with an irregular rhythm. Electrocardiogram is the most important tool used to
diagnose arrhythmia. Changes in the heart tissue or the electrical signal of the heart can be some
of the potential causes for arrhythmia. There may be no symptoms at all, or it can come with
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symptoms such as a fluttering in the chest, chest pain, fainting, or dizziness. Table 1 describes
some arrhythmias.
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Table 1 Arrhythmias (source https://nurseslabs.com/ekg-interpretation-cheat-sheet/)
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Table 2 Arrhythmias continued (source https://nurseslabs.com/ekg-interpretation-cheatsheet/)
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Table 3 Arrhythmias continued (source https://nurseslabs.com/ekg-interpretation-cheatsheet/)
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2 Introduction to Automated ECG
Analysis
Automated analysis of ECG data using machine learning techniques has been the focus of many
recent cardiac research efforts such as arrhythmia classification and accurate prediction of
ventricular arrhythmia origins [1] [2]. Furthermore, ECG data have also been used for emotion
recognition [3] [4]. A typical ECG machine learning pipeline includes denoising and baseline
correction, heartbeat segmentation and QRS detection, feature extraction, and model training.

2.1

Denoising

Different sources can cause noise during the recording of ECG. For instance, AC current noise
may be caused by the nearby electrical equipment or the bed where the patient is resting on. Figure
5 shows an ECG signal before and after denoising.

Figure 5 Denoising ECG (source Alyasseri et al [5])
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2.2

Wandering baseline correction

Baseline wander is a low frequency noise in the ECG that is caused by breathing, subject
movement and other reasons. Figure 6 shows an ECG with a wondering baseline.

Figure 6 Wandering baseline correction (source Singh et al [6])
For example, de Chazal et al. applied a median filter of 200 ms width to remove QRS complexes
and P-waves and another median filter of 600 ms width to remove T-waves, and eventually a 12tap low-pass FIR filter with 3-dB point at 35 Hz is used to straighten the wandering baseline [7].
Ye et al. used a wavelet-based technique to fix the baseline wander [8].
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2.3

Heartbeat Segmentation

In this step, we identify individual heartbeats in an ECG recording. This is important since we
need to know the boundaries of a heartbeat in order to extract features or to use it in a raw form as
an input to ML algorithms. This is not as easy as it might sound and requires complex mathematical
functions. The most important problem in heartbeat segmentation is R-peak detection or QRS
complex detection. As shown in Figure 7, in many cases, R-peak to R-peak can be used as the
segments which is easier to identify. This removes the need for PQRST boundary detection, which
is a more difficult task.

Figure 7 R-peak to R-peak segmentation (source Luz et al [9])
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2.4

Feature Extraction

In this step, we extract features from the raw heartbeat signals in order to feed into our machine
learning algorithm. The raw signal can be fed directly to some Machine Learning algorithms such
as neural networks models which eliminates the need for feature engineering. However, with nondeep learning models, feature extraction is the key to the performance of the final model
(Obviously, we could still use extracted features to train a neural network). Feature extraction often
succeeds with a feature selection or dimensionality reduction step to pick the best subset of the
features.
Both temporal/morphological features like amplitude, duration, or slopes of different sections of
the PQRST segment and frequency domain features like Fourier or wavelet transformation
coefficients have been used by researchers. QRS duration and amplitude of the P-wave are
example features from the time domain and Daubechies discrete wavelet transformation
coefficients, wavelet scaleograms, and Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) coefficients are
example features from the frequency domain. For instance, scalegroms are time-frequency
representations of the ECG signals, i.e., the absolute value of the CWT coefficients of a signal. In
the images below. Figure 8 shows the scaleogram of a normal heartbeat (lead 2) vs a heartbeat
from a patient with atrial fibrillation condition. Figure 9 shows the shape of different mother
wavelets for reference. Table 4 summarizes the features and machine learning models used in ECG
analysis by researchers.
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Figure 8 Morlet wavelet based scalegrom of a normal heartbeat vs an atrial fibrillation

Figure 9 Base wavelets
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Even though the Fourier method can be used for spectral decomposition of a signal, it lacks the
ability to represent the signal simultaneously in both time and frequency domains, especially when
the signal is localized like the QRS complex in ECG signals. Both continuous and discrete wavelet
transformations have been applied to ECG analysis, including Db4, quadratic spline wavelet and
others. Wavelet features have been used for detecting the location of QRS complex and also for
classification of diseases.
In addition to common techniques, other non-conventional mathematical techniques have been
applied to automated ECG analysis, for example fractals [10] or Hermite polynomials [11] [12]
Table 4 Example features and machine learning models used in ECG research
work

features

model

de Chazal et al. [7]

Morphological

Weighted LD

Morphological, wavelet

Decision

tree

support

vector

Bazi et al. [13]
machine, SVM
and Martinez [14]

Wavelet

Weighted LD

Ye et al. [8]

Morphological,

Wavelet,

RR

SVM

interval, ICA, PCA
Karimifard et al. [15]

Hermitian basis functions

kNN

Yeh et al. [16]

Morphological

clustering

Wang et al. [17]

PCA, LDA

probabilistic
(PNN)

15

neural

network

2.5

Model Training

Support Vector Machines (SVM), naive Bayes, random forest, and neural networks and their
variations have been some of the commonly used machine learning techniques in ECG research.
Table 4 shows some example Machine Learning techniques used in automated ECG analysis
research. Due to both the availability of accelerated hardware like GPUs and the advancement in
neural network techniques, many researchers have adopted deep learning models for automated
ECG analysis. Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13 show some deep learning
architectures used for ECG analysis by researchers.

Figure 10 Unidimensional residual neural network architecture used for ECG abnormality
classification (Ribeiro et al [18])
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Figure 11 Deep learning architecture for arrhythmia detection (Rajpurkar et al [19])
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Figure 12 CNN model for ECG identification (Pinto et al [20])

Figure 13 Deep learning architecture for ECG Identification system (Ibtehaz et al [21])
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2.6

ECG Datasets

Majority of the published research in ECG analysis use publicly available ECG datasets.
Specifically, the most widely used dataset in the literature is MIT-BIH, which contains 30 minutes
ECG recording from 47 patients at 360 Hz. There are other open ECG datasets such as EDB which
is the European Society of Cardiology ST-T Database including 90 2-hour ECG recordings, and
AHA dataset which is The American Heart Association database for evaluation of ventricular
arrhythmia

detectors

including

80

35-minute

ECG

recording.

Physionet

website

(https://physionet.org) offers access to a large collection of physiologic signals data including ECG
datasets.

2.7

Challenges

Access to ECG data for research is one of the main challenges in this field. There are a small
number of publicly available ECG datasets from a small number of patients. Additionally,
comparison of the results and accuracy of the models across different publication is a difficult task,
since some researchers reported the results on their own proprietary data. Additionally, the
evaluation methods vary, for example some researchers used an inter-patient where heartbeats
from different patients are used in train and test, and some other used an intra-patient method
where heartbeats of the same patients appear in both train and test splits. The limited size of these
datasets, biased evaluation method (like intra-patient evaluation in arrhythmia classification) has
made the reported results in the literature less generalizable and unreliable.
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2.8

AAMI Standard

Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation has developed ANSI/AAMI EC57
standard for ECG and Arrhythmia research with the goal of making the experiments in this field
more comparable and reproducible [22]. For example, they recommend reporting results on five
popular open ECG datasets: MIT-BIH, EDB, AHA, CU, NST. They also recommend excluding
records from patients with pacemakers. Additionally, the AAMI standard recommends 15 types of
arrhythmia for automated classification research. These 15 classes are classified into 5 groups:
Normal (N), Supraventricular ectopic beat (SVEB), Ventricular ectopic beat (VEB), Fusion beat
(F) and Unknown beat (Q). This is described at Table 5.
Table 5 ECG classes in AAMI standard
Group
N

Symbol

Class

N ou .

Normal beat

(Any
heartbeat
not L
categorized as SVEB, VEB, F R
or Q)
e
j
SVEB
A
(Supraventricular
ectopic a
beat)
J
S
VEB (Ventricular ectopic V
beat)
E
F (Fusion beat)
F
Q (Unknown beat)
P ou /
f
U

Left bundle branch block beat
Right bundle branch block beat
Atrial escape beat
Nodal (junctional) escape beat
Atrial premature beat
Aberrated atrial premature beat
Nodal (junctional) premature beat
Supraventricular premature beat
Premature ventricular contraction
Ventricular escape beat
Fusion of ventricular
Paced beat
Fusion of paced and normal beat
Unclassifiable beat

Regarding the evaluation, due to severe class imbalance in ECG datasets, AAMI recommends
reporting the performance of the models in terms of sensitivity (recall), positive predictivity (+P
or precision), and False Positive Rate (FPR), in addition to and Overall accuracy (Acc). Figure
shows the calculations for the evaluation method proposed by AAMI.
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Figure 14 Calculations for evaluation method proposed by AAMI standard [7]
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3 Introduction to Data Privacy
3.1

Introduction

Oxford dictionary defines privacy as: “the state of being alone and not watched or interrupted by other
people” and “the state of being free from the attention of the public”. Wikipedia defines privacy as:
“Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to seclude themselves or information about themselves,
and thereby express themselves selectively.” In United States, the first mention of privacy in a publication
goes back to 1890 when jurists Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote the article "The Right to
Privacy", in which they talked about the "right to be let alone".
Privacy has found a critical importance as we have entered the era of internet and big data. All of our
social interactions, the exact location where we travel, our vital and health signals, and all other aspects
of our daily lives are being continually collected and stored in the cloud and over the internet permanently.
Privacy becomes even more important when it comes to sensitive data like healthcare and medical, since
the unwanted leakage of these information can harm citizens in different ways. On the other hand, modern
science is heavily reliant on data for discovery and advancement and data mining has become a vital part
of all different scientific disciplines. Consequently, this makes privacy preserving data analysis, i.e.,
being able to collect and analyze data and share the results with public without compromising individuals’
privacy, an extremely important research topic in our times.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA or the Kennedy–Kassebaum Act) of
1996 is a United States federal statute which establishes regulatory thresholds regarding data from health
records to protect all individually identifiable health information from patients. It was enacted by the
104th United States Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton on August 21, 1996 [23] [24]. HIPAA
22

has two mechanisms for assessing the identifiability of electronic health records: The Safe Harbor
standard and the Expert Determination standard. The Safe Harbor standard states that a dataset derived
from health records should not contain any of the 18 HIPAA identifiers in order to be considered as deidentified [25]. Table 6 shows the list of the 18 HIPAA identifiers. These identifiers alone or in
conjunction with other data can be used to identify, contact, or locate a patient. Protected Health
Information (PHI) is any information about health status, provision of health care, or payment for health
care and can be linked to a specific individual (via the 18 identifier or other identifiers). HIPAA Privacy
rule protects individually identifiable health information of deceased individuals for 50 years following
the date of death. The Safe Harbor standard states that the data steward must also have no “actual
knowledge” that other variables in the dataset can be a potential indirect identifier not listed by the law.
On the other hand, the Expert Determination standard enforces that a person with knowledge of the data
and statistics must verify that the risk of re-identification is “very small.”
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Table 6 HIPAA 18 identifiers
Number
1
2

Identifier
Name
Address

3

Dates

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Telephone number
Fax number
Email address
Social Security number
Medical record number
Health plan/insurance beneficiary number
Account number
Certificate / license number
Any vehicle identifiers (e.g., license plate
number)
Device identifiers and serial numbers
Web URLs (Links)
Internet Protocol (IP) address
Biometric identifiers (finger / retinal / voice)
Photographic images
Photographic images are not limited
to images of the face
Any other characteristic that may be used to
uniquely identify an individual

13
14
15
16
17
18

3.2

Notes
All geographic subdivisions smaller
than state, including street address,
city county, and zip code
All elements (except years) of dates
related to an individual including
birthdate,
admission
date,
appointments date, payments date,
discharge date, date of death, and
exact age if over 89

Re-identification

Re-identification is the practice of discovering the individuals in an anonymized database by matching
the records with publicly available information (auxiliary data). Having the wrong belief that
anonymizing data protects the privacy of individuals, many institutions release anonymized data for
research purposes. For example, in 1997, researchers from MIT were able to re-identify the governor of
Massachusetts in an anonymized healthcare insurance database released for research purposes [26]. They
were able to re-identify him by matching this database with the publicly available voter registration data.
24

As another example, in 2006 Netflix publicly released one-hundred million records of its users’ ratings
for its recommender system contest. There was a one-million-dollar prize for the first team who
significantly improves their movie recommendation algorithm. Even though the direct identifiers were
removed, and the database was anonymized, two researchers were able to re-identify a subset of the
Netflix users by cross-matching the Netflix data with IMDB ratings [27]. AOL search data released in
2006 is also another well-known example of data re-identification, they shared 20 million search queries
from 650,000 users from. In an attempt to de-identify the data, identifiers like usernames and IP addresses
were removed before releasing the data to the public. Soon after the release, by analyzing the search
queries, two New York Times reporters were able to track down a sixty-two-year-old widow in Georgia
and knock on her door [28].

3.3

Privacy Preserving Data Analysis

In this section, we briefly overview some of the techniques proposed in the recent years to address the
challenge of both being able to share data and analysis and also to protect the privacy of individuals. Of
the four techniques that we will discuss, K-anonymity and differential privacy try to explicitly solve the
privacy issue in data analysis, i.e., they put a guarantee on the amount of privacy offered. As you will see,
these techniques are a tradeoff between utility (accuracy of the results) and privacy. On the other hand,
techniques like federated learning and homomorphic encryption even though do not guarantee privacy,
they have the potential to reduce the privacy risk as both techniques eliminate the need to share the records
in its original format.

25

3.3.1 K-Anonymity
The k-anonymity model is one of the earliest and most intuitive models proposed for privacy preservation
[29]. Specifically, it tries to solve the problem: "Given person-specific field-structured data, produce a
release of the data with scientific guarantees that the individuals who are the subjects of the data cannot
be re-identified while the data remain practically useful. The k-anonymity model guarantees that no
individual can be linked with fewer than k rows in a released table [30] [31] [32]. This is achieved by
converting the original data table to a new form where there are at least k rows with the same combination
of values in the public attributes. Two main methods are used to convert a table into k-anonymous form:
generalization and suppression. In generalization, a public attribute value is replaced with a less
specific/broader category value. In suppression, a value is removed from the table (or replaced with an
asterisk). For example, Table 7 and Table 8 show a hypothetical cardiology table before and after 2anonymization with respect to name, age, gender, and state fields.
Table 7 Original patient data
Name

Age

Gender

State

Disease

Alice

30

Female

CA

Sinus Tachycardia

Robert

24

Male

CA

Atrial Fibrillation

Jamie

43

Female

NY

Sinus Bradycardia

John

49

Male

NY

Atrial Fibrillation

Melina

44

Female

CA

Sinus Bradycardia

William

26

Male

NY

Sinus Tachycardia
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Table 8 2-anonymizied patient data
Name

Age

Gender

State

Disease

*

20 < Age ≤ 30

Female

CA

Sinus Tachycardia

*

20 < Age ≤ 30

Male

NY

Atrial Fibrillation

*

40 < Age ≤ 50

Female

WA

Sinus Bradycardia

*

40 < Age ≤ 50

Female

WA

Atrial Fibrillation

*

40 < Age ≤ 50

Female

WA

Sinus Bradycardia

*

20 < Age ≤ 30

Male

NY

Sinus Tachycardia

*

20 < Age ≤ 30

Female

CA

Atrial Fibrillation

It can be proved that k-anonymizing tables optimally (such that their data is minimally distorted) is an
NP-hard problem [33]. But effective approximation or heuristics algorithms have been proposed by
researchers [34] [35]. In the terminology of k-anonymity, these fields that are available in public datasets
to the adversary are called quasi-identifiers. The adversary tries to attack privacy by linking these quasiidentifiers in the released data with the publicly available data in order to release private data about the
individuals. Quasi-identifiers are not themselves unique identifiers, however once combined with other
quasi-identifiers might create a unique identifier.
The main drawback with the k-anonymity technique is the fact that it does not consider the distribution
of sensitive attributes. For example, all individuals in an equivalence class might have the same sensitive
value. To address this problem, l-diversity technique was proposed to address this problem, which works
by limiting the probability of inferring a sensitive value by 1&𝑙 [36].
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3.3.2 Differential Privacy
In contrast to common the belief that statistical aggregate databases are safe to share, it can be proven
that aggregation and basic anonymization does not guarantee privacy and individuals can be re-identified
even from the published aggregated results. Being able to share aggregated statistics from private datasets,
while preserving individual’s privacy, can be very beneficial. Differential privacy is an answer to this
challenge [37]. There have been multiple incidents in the past two decades where individuals have been
re-identified from anonymized or aggregated databases. The randomized algorithm M is said to be 𝜖differentially private if for all neighboring datasets D and D' that differ only on a single element (i.e., the
record of one person), and all subsets S⊆R of outputs of M:
Pr [𝑀(𝐷) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ 𝑒 6 Pr [𝑀(𝐷′) ∈ 𝑆]
Equation 1
This ensures that addition/removal of a single person to the database does not change the results of
analysis too much. More specifically, the probability that the outcome of an analysis changes after adding
an individual's record to the database is guaranteed to be limited by a factor of e^ϵ. This makes the exposed
differentially private query engine immune to attacks in the presence of unforeseen auxiliary information.
There is also an (ϵ,δ) differential privacy definition, in which a small chance of accidental information
leakage is allowed via the δ parameter:
Pr [𝑀(𝐷) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ 𝑒 6 Pr [𝑀(𝐷′) ∈ 𝑆] + δ
Equation 2
There are two important mechanisms for adding noise in differential privacy: Laplace and exponential.
The most commonly used mechanism is Laplace which adds noise drawn from a Laplace distribution
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with mean zero and scale of ∆f/ϵ (∆f is the sensitivity of function f). To recall, we define Laplace
distribution Lap(x│b) to be:

𝐿𝑎𝑝(𝑥|𝑏) =

1 A|B|
𝑒 C
2𝑏

Equation 3
As you can see, in addition to 𝜖, we also need to specify the sensitivity of our function (∆𝑓): The maximum
change in the result of a function 𝑓 when we add or remove one record to/from the database. We define
𝑙D sensitivity of a function 𝑓, 𝑁 |B| → 𝑅H :
∆𝑓 = max|𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑦)| 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑁 |B| , |𝑥 − 𝑦| = 1
Equation 4
Notice that this sensitivity is the global sensitivity, i.e., the maximum possible change of function f due
to addition or removal of one record from the set of all possible records for that database. Global
sensitivity is used to guarantee the amount of privacy loss in the worst-case scenario. Differential privacy
has two modes: interactive and non-interactive. The interactive mode works by perturbing the results of
a query before returning to the analyst. On the other hand, in the non-interactive setting the data custodian
either publishes some statistics and results on the database or anonymizes and releases the raw database.
It can be proven that there is no private mechanism which can answer arbitrary number of queries
accurately. Dinur and Nissim [38] prove that in a database of records consisting of bits, if a user wants to
know the sum of a random subset of the bits, then no private mechanism can answer n queries with error
Ο(√n). Thus, a total budget for 𝜖 should be allocated for a differentially private database and once the
users exhaust this 𝜖 budget, the database needs to be shut down to prevent potential privacy leak.
Similarly, if a researcher (trusted party) wants to publish the results from a private research database
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safely to the public (untrusted parties) using differential privacy techniques, then a total 𝜖 budget needs
to be determined. This total budget is then distributed across all queries used to generate the results. Its
robustness to post-processing, composability, and graceful degradation in the presence of correlated data
makes differential privacy even more attractive, as we can build complicated differentially private
mechanisms in a modular fashion with a guarantee on the amount of privacy loss in the worst-case
scenario. A very useful characteristic of differential privacy is its composability: Given a set of
differentially private computations, the overall privacy loss parameter is equal to the sum of epsilons for
each query. In other words, if 𝐹D(B) is 𝜖D differentially private and 𝐹P(B) is 𝜖P differentially private, then
the mechanism 𝐺(𝑥) = (𝐹D(B) , 𝐹P (𝑥)) which releases both query results is 𝜖D + 𝜖P differentially private.

3.3.3 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a form of data encryption that allows calculations to be performed on
the encrypted data directly without the need to decrypt it first. The output of the computation is also in
encrypted form, but once decrypted it is the same as if the calculations had been performed on the original
unencrypted data [39] [40]. To recall, in algebra a homomorphism is a map between two algebraic
structures of the same type that preserves the operations of the structures:
𝑓: 𝑥 → 𝑦

𝑓(𝑥. 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥). 𝑓(𝑦)
Equation 5

This allows new opportunities in out-sourcing of the analytics to third parties and storing and sharing data
in cloud environments. For instance, in the healthcare field where contents of the data are very sensitive
and strict regulatory laws are governing, using homomorphic encryption, one can outsource their
predictive model training to third party service provider. Since, the third-party analytics company will
operate on encrypted data, this completely eliminates the privacy concerns. The biggest challenge in HE
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is the computational cost, but there have been noticeable improvements in the performance of these
algorithms making homomorphic-cryptosystems practical [41].

3.3.4 Federated Learning
Federated learning (also called collaborative learning) is a machine learning technique that trains a
machine learning model across multiple decentralized edge devices or servers storing local data samples.
This happens without any transfer or sharing of data from their local storages, thus addressing the
challenge of data privacy, security, and data access rights while allowing to perform analysis and build
models. In contrast to traditional centralized machine learning algorithms where all the local datasets are
uploaded to a central location and then we train a single model on top of the whole dataset, in federated
learning each machine builds a model only using the samples they have and then these mini models get
aggregated to a single global model for the whole population. Throughout this process, only machine
learning parameters are exchanged and not the actual records. This should not be confused with the
distributed learning which aims at parallelizing computations across a number of machines to train a
single model (with the assumption that local datasets are identically distributed (i.i.d.) and are almost the
same size). There are no assumptions in federated learning, neither regarding the distribution of the data
nor the size. Local datasets in federated learning can be heterogenous and of very different sizes. There
are two settings: the centralized setting where a central server orchestrates the process and the
decentralized version where the nodes coordinate themselves to create the global model to avoid a single
point of failure which can happen in centralized model.
Federated learning works in iterations known as a federated learning round. In each round, it transmits
the current global model to the nodes, then train local models using the local data producing model
updates at each node, finally aggregating these local updates into the global model [42]. Figure 15
Centralized federated learning process describes this process.
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Federated learning can also be used to create a personalized model for each user (for instance on the edge
device like a smart phone) in addition to the global model [43]. This can also be very helpful to comply
to the legal frameworks such as the White House 2012 Report [44] guidelines regarding the application
of a data minimization principle or the European GDPR [45]. For example, some countries limit the
sharing and exchange of data from their citizens. In such scenarios federated learning allows us to train a
global model across many countries and institution while eliminating the need to share data [46].

Figure 15 Centralized federated learning process (source
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federated_learning)
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4 Data
In this section, we introduce the data used in our experiments. 10k Data (section 4.1) is used for the
differential privacy case study in Chapter 7. In Chapter 6, we trained separate ECG identification deep
learning models on both 40K Data (section 4.2) and also 80k Data (section 4.3).

4.1

10k Data

This is an open research dataset containing 10-second recordings of 12-lead ECG with 500 Hz sampling
rate from 10,646 patients [47]. It features 11 common rhythms and 67 cardiovascular conditions labeled
by experts. Table 9 shows the codes used for these eleven types of rhythms and their definitions. This
dataset is openly available at https://figshare.com/collections/ChapmanECG/4560497.
Table 9 Arrhythmia type codes in China public data 1 and their full names
Label

Full Name

SB
SR
AFIB
ST
AF
SA
SVT
AT
AVNRT
AVRT
SAAWR

Sinus Bradycardia
Sinus Rhythm
Atrial Fibrillation
Sinus Tachycardia
Atrial Flutter
Sinus Irregularity
Supraventricular Tachycardia
Atrial Tachycardia
Atrioventricular Node Reentrant Tachycardia
Atrioventricular Reentrant Tachycardia
Sinus Atrium to Atrial Wandering Rhythm
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4.2

40K Data

This dataset contains 12-lead ECG data from the China public 1 data (introduced in the previous section)
containing 10,646 samples, plus an open access data with 344 ECG recordings respectively [48], as well
as an additional dataset from the Ningbo First Hospital, including 34,320 ECG recordings. The
institutional review board of Ningbo First Hospital approved this study and granted the waiver of the
requirement to obtain informed consent. There are 88 cardiac conditions present in the combined data
that contains 45,310 ECG recordings consisting of 10-second, 12-lead ECGs with 500 Hz sampling rate.
Cardiologist-supervised physicians interpreted each recording and gave cardiac condition labels and ECG
findings. The number of volts per A/D bit was 4.88, and the A/D converter had 32-bit resolution with
upper and lower limits of32,767 and -32,768 microvolts respectively. Table 10 Baseline characteristics
of the enrolled participants shows the baseline characteristics of this dataset.

4.3

80k Data

The 12-lead ECG data used in this work consisted of three open access research resources and the data
introduced in section 4.2. The first open access dataset was used in the China Physiological Signal
Challenge in 2018 [49]. This source contains 10,330 ECGs. Each recording is between 6 and 144 seconds
long with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz. The second source is the Physikalisch-Technische
Bundesanstalt (PTB) ECG dataset [50] that consists of 21837 clinical 12-lead ECGs from 18885 patients
of 10 second length. The raw waveform data was annotated by up to two cardiologists, who assigned
potentially multiple ECG statements to each record. The third source is a Georgia database that
encompassed 10,334 ECGs and represented a unique demographic of the Southeastern United States [51].
Each recording is between 5 and 10 seconds long with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz. Finally, there
were 88 cardiac conditions present in the combined data that contains 87,467 ECG recordings.

34

Table 10 Baseline characteristics of the enrolled participants
Condition Name

Number of Heartbeats
in Validation
Ventricular Fibrillation
118
Ventricular Escape Beat
288
Complete Atrioventricular Block
114
Junctional Escape Rhythm
202
Pacemaker ECG
3700
Paroxysmal Ventricular Tachycardia
258
Premature Ventricular Contractions (PVC)
2864
Junctional Escape Beat
142
Aberrant Ventricular Conduction
970
Prolonged QT Interval
458
Wolff Parkinson White Pattern (WPW)
170
Intraventricular Block
946
Atrial Fibrillation
15238
Atrioventricular Block (AV Block)
228
Right Bundle Branch Block (RBBB)
530
Atrial Premature Beat
2856
Myocardial Infarction
438
Clockwise Vectorcardiographic Loop
626
Incomplete RBBB
634
Left Anterior Fascicular Block
958
Atrial Tachycardia
526
Complete RBBB
2814
Atrial Flutter
4110
Left Axis Deviation
3082
Complete Left Bundle Branch Block (LBBB)
560
Right Axis Deviation
1710
1st Degree Atrioventricular Block
2280
Ventricular Early Repolarization
836
Counterclockwise Vectorcardiographic Loop 1146
(CVL)
Sinus Bradycardia
32556
Sinus Irregularity
5526
Sinus Tachycardia
14388
Supraventricular Tachycardia (SVT)
1340
Sinus Rhythm
16188
Atrial Rhythm
436
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Misidentification Rate
45.76%
25.00%
21.05%
18.81%
11.73%
11.24%
11.21%
9.86%
8.76%
8.30%
8.24%
6.98%
5.79%
5.70%
5.66%
5.53%
5.48%
5.43%
5.36%
5.32%
5.13%
4.94%
4.91%
4.90%
4.11%
4.04%
3.86%
3.47%
2.79%
2.74%
2.50%
2.40%
2.24%
2.13%
1.61%

4.4

Preprocessing

In order to improve the data input quality supplied to the neural network, we carried out a three-stage
noise reduction process including Butterworth low-pass filter to remove high-frequency noise (above 50
Hz), the Robust LOESS to eliminate baseline wandering, and Non-Local Means (NLM) to remove
residual noise [1]. These filters help to reduce the noise in ECG signals caused by known sources such as
power line interference, electrode contact noise, motion artifacts, skeletal muscle contraction, and random
noise. The low frequency ($<$0.5Hz) baseline wandering noise component could be caused by
respiration. The power line interference is the major cause for high frequency (50-60Hz) noise
component. R-peak to R-peaks are extracted from each ECG recording and down sampled to 300 points.
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5 ECG Identification Models
The shape of ECG signal is unique for each person. In the absence of major cardiac events or conditions,
an individual's ECG stays relatively unchanged over time. These qualities make ECG a good candidate
as a biometric identifier (electro-physiologic) which can be used for human authentication and
identification purposes, similar to fingerprint and iris [52] [53]. In addition to being a unique and stable
identifier, ECG eliminates the aliveness test required in some other forms of biometric systems since
heart signal is an inherently alive biometric. In this chapter, we investigate the use of ECGs as a biometric
in human identification systems via an implementation of deep learning models.

5.1

Literature Review

The idea of leveraging ECG as a biometric identifier was introduced by Forsen et al in 1977 [54]. Biel et
al [52] were the first to implement an ECG biometric system in 1999. Even though, subsequent studies
have reported high accuracies in ECG identification, all of them were based on a small number of subjects,
ranging from ten to a couple of hundreds. This undermines the results since ECG identification systems
in real world scenarios are supposed to run on a large population. Labati et al [55] extracted features from
ECG using a CNN-based deep learning model and achieved 100% accuracy on approximately 50 human
subjects. Belo et al [56] leveraged Temporal Convolutional Neural Network (TCNN) and Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) for both ECG identification and authentication. Overall, the TCNN model
outperformed the RNN achieving 100%, 96% and 90% accuracy on Fantasia (40 subjects), MIT-BIH (47
subject), and CYBHi (63 subjects) databases respectively. Salloum and Kuo [57] used Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNN) with Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Units (GRU) reaching
100% identification rate on 90 subjects from the public ECG-ID database. Deshmane and Madhe [58]
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proposed a CNN based approach achieving 81.33%, 96.95%, 94.73%, and 92.85% accuracies on MITBIH (47 subject), FANTASIA (40 subjects), NSRDB (18 subjects), and QT databases (105 subjects).
Eduardo et al [59] used autoencoders for denoising and feature extraction in an ECG biometric system.
Zhang et al [60] achieved an average identification rate of 93.5% using a multi-resolution CNN on
datasets of 18 to 47 subjects. Li et al [61] implemented two cascaded CNNs, the first CNN is used for
feature extraction from ECG heartbeats and the second one is used for identification. They achieved
99.52% accuracy on 184 subjects.

5.2

Training the Deep Learning Model on the 40k Database

Figure 16, we implemented a Convolutional Neural Network with three repeated sequences of
convolution, batch normalization, and max pooling, followed by a flattening layer, two dense layers, and
a final output softmax layer. The number of units in the final softmax layer is equal to the number of
patients in the dataset. We used relu activation function for all of the convolutional layers. The input
vector was a vector of length 12*300 representing the 12 leads data for a single R-to-R interval. The
labels were the encoded numbers for the patient IDs in the database. Adam optimizer was used with sparse
categorical crossentropy loss function. We trained the model on the GPU machines provided by the Keck
computational research cluster at Chapman University and Google AI cloud computing platform.
The data consisted of 38,378 patients’ ECG samples in both the training and test sets. We randomly
selected 20% of the R-to-R intervals from each patient to be used in the validation set and the rest were
used in the training set. Thus, all individuals were present in both the training and validation sets but with
distinct and non-overlapping R-to-R interval data. There was a total of 497,911 R-to-R intervals, of which
398,328 were used in the training and 99,583 in the test sets respectively. We achieved an accuracy of
94.56% (the percent of the total number of R-to-R intervals in the validation data identified correctly).
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Figure 17 shows the convergence curve from the model training. It is clear that the training and validation
curves have a good fit.

Figure 16 Deep Learning architecture for 40k data model
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Figure 17 convergence curve for the 40k data model

5.3

Results

In this study we trained a model with 38,378 subjects in both the training and validation datasets. The
accuracy attained by the algorithm was high at 94.56%.

5.3.1 Identification rate per condition
To assess the privacy risks for cardiology patients posed by ECG identification technology, we calculated
the misidentifications proportions per disease in our validation set. We considered two scenarios in our
calculations. In the first scenario, multiple diagnoses per patient were flattened, meaning that if a patient
who was misidentified had two conditions, we counted that as misidentification in both category of
conditions. In the second scenario, we assumed multiple diagnoses for a patient as a single category to
understand the joint effect of multiple conditions on the misidentification rate. The results for conditions
where we had more than 500 samples are shown in Table 11 and Table 12. The full names for the
diagnosis codes are provided at Table 17.
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Table 11 Identification rate per single condition in 40k data model
Condition Name

Number of R-to-R
Intervals in Validation

Identification Rate (%)

SVT
STach
ERe
SNR
SB
CCVCL
TPW
STE
TTW
IAVB
RAD
AFL
STC
LVHV
LVH
IRBBB
LQRSV
LAnFB
LQT
TAb
TInv
STD
SA
QAb
CRBBB
RBBB
PRWP
LAD
CVCL
CLBBB
Intraventricular Block
AF
ATach
PAC
AVC
PR

3244
21120
734
17108
25573
1371
847
2230
906
2173
2438
6377
16683
11570
2069
821
2754
1203
888
14706
8194
4571
5154
2572
3480
634
2020
3675
928
785
1149
20718
1022
3201
2251
2273

98.55
97.14
97.0
96.98
95.67
95.55
95.51
95.47
95.14
94.85
94.75
93.9
93.8
93.54
93.23
93.06
92.85
92.77
92.68
92.54
92.51
92.5
92.39
92.03
91.87
91.8
91.58
91.56
91.27
90.32
89.99
88.92
88.06
87.19
82.14
80.2
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Table 12 Identification rate per joint condition in 40k data model
Condition Name

Number of R-to-R Intervals in
Validation

Identification Rate (%)

STC SVT
SVT
STach TAb
STach
STC STach
SNR
AFL STC
SB
SNR TAb
LVHV SB
SB TAb
AFL
SA
AF STC
SA SB
AF LVHV
AF TAb
AF
AF LVHV STC

937
900
1187
8403
1641
12335
921
13777
680
1992
1045
979
2556
1381
653
844
1631
3922
699

99.25
99.0
98.9
98.55
97.87
97.58
97.07
96.66
96.62
96.44
96.27
94.99
93.62
93.12
92.8
91.82
91.48
91.46
91.13

Some conditions such as premature ventricular contractions, aberrant ventricular conduction, or patients
with pacemaker have low identification rates, while healthy sinus rhythm and conditions like sinus
tachycardia, and supraventricular tachycardia have high identification rates. One observation is that in
contrast to the common expectation, some conditions have even a better identification rate than normal
sinus rhythm. For instance, the highest identification rate was attained for patients diagnosed with both
ST changes and supraventricular tachycardia (99.25%). The identification rate for patients with a
pacemaker is 80.2%. Patients with conditions which have high identification accuracy rates should be
more concerned with the protection of their ECG data.
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5.4

Training the Deep Learning Model on the 80k Data

As shown in Figure 18 for the 80k data, we implemented a different Convolutional Neural Network with
six one-dimensional convolutional sequences, of which the first five layers are horizontal (temporal)
convolutions of kernel size 1*5 and the sixth layer is a vertical (spatial) convolution of kernel size 12*1.
Other than the first sequence which consists of a convolution and then a batch normalization, the
remaining five are sequences of a convolution, batch normalization, and a max-pooling layer. The
convolutional layers are followed by a flattening layer, and two sequences of dense and dropout layers.
The final layer consists of softmax units equal to the number of patients in the dataset. We used relu
activation function for all of the convolutional and dense layers. Overall, the architecture resembles a
spatial-temporal model where the first five convolutional sequence try to discover patterns across each of
the 12 ECG leads and the last sequence looks for pattern across all leads at one point of time. The input
vector is a 12*300 vector representing the 12-lead data consisting of R-to-R interval measurements. The
labels are the encoded IDs for the patient in the database. Adam optimizer is used with a sparse categorical
cross entropy loss function. An intra-patient validation method was adopted as it is a fair evaluation
method for identification systems. In order to do so, we randomly selected 20% of heartbeats from each
patient to be used in the validation set and the rest of the heartbeats were used in the training set. Thus,
all patients were present in both the training and validation sets but with distinct, non-overlapping
heartbeat data. Figure 19 shows the good fit in the convergence curve from the model training.
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Figure 18 Deep Learning model architecture used for the 80k data model
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Figure 19 Convergence curve for the 80k data model

5.5

Results

There was a total of 1,142,859 R-to-R interval data from 80,746 patients split into two sets of sizes
914,287 and 228,572 for the train and validation samples respectively. Our optimal CNN model attained
an overall accuracy of 95.69% over all R-to-R interval validation data for the entire sample of 80,746
patients.

5.5.1 Identification Rate Per Condition
Again, in our per condition analysis, we considered single and multiple conditions scenarios. In the single
condition analysis, a misidentified patient with one or several conditions was counted as misidentified for
all conditions. The total misidentification rates per condition were calculated as the proportion of
misidentified patients with each condition among all patients with the same condition.
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Table 13 Identification rate per single condition in 80k data model
Condition Name
AAR
SPRI
PMI
AJR
IIAVBII
PTW
LAHV
Brugada
SVT
AMI
RAHV
JTach
TPW
CCVCL
TTW
Atrial Rhythm
PPW
SB
RRWP
ERe
SNR
STach
AVB
RAD
LVHV
LQRSV
TAb
LPFB
TInv
LPR
LMI
Intraventricular Block
CVCL
SA
AFL
Atrial Escape Beat
LAD
LQT
LVH

Number of Heartbeats in
Validation
39.0
66.0
52.0
74.0
7.0
11.0
4.0
13.0
3552.0
216.0
120.0
98.0
857.0
1371.0
892.0
417.0
319.0
29959.0
121.0
1048.0
62107.0
29104.0
477.0
2673.0
11611.0
4038.0
25232.0
521.0
10709.0
847.0
572.0
1159.0
944.0
7780.0
7451.0
31.0
5857.0
4342.0
11037.0
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Identification Rate
(%)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.55
99.54
99.17
98.98
98.95
98.76
98.65
98.56
98.43
98.42
98.35
98.19
98.15
97.96
97.9
97.68
97.66
97.62
97.21
97.12
97.09
97.05
97.03
96.98
96.93
96.83
96.82
96.77
96.76
96.75
96.62

PRWP
QAb
WPW
LAnFB
LAH
RBBB
PWC
VFL
STC
RVH
CLBBB
UAb
AVD
AVC
AnMI
InMI
RAH
IRBBB
IAVB
STD
PVT
ATach
RAVC
Brady
JE
AF
ILBBB
PAC
BPAC
IIAVB
CAVB
STE
PR
IIAVBI
FB
CRBBB
SPVB
AIVR
OldMI
PVC
MI
JPC
VEsR

1996.0
3566.0
402.0
5149.0
3246.0
1883.0
562.0
24.0
46469.0
1068.0
2018.0
271.0
102.0
4453.0
7423.0
7458.0
500.0
4682.0
9410.0
12546.0
532.0
1199.0
47.0
1182.0
153.0
34954.0
677.0
9091.0
171.0
236.0
230.0
4189.0
3128.0
65.0
261.0
14719.0
487.0
23.0
5809.0
13206.0
1555.0
47.0
69.0
47

96.59
96.55
96.52
96.5
96.4
96.18
96.09
95.83
95.63
95.32
95.24
95.2
95.1
94.32
94.3
94.25
94.2
94.02
94.0
93.51
93.23
92.99
91.49
91.2
90.85
90.72
90.25
90.11
90.06
89.83
89.57
89.5
89.29
89.23
88.89
87.6
87.47
86.96
86.64
86.04
85.14
85.11
84.06

LBBB
AVJR
VEsB
SAB
SARR
VF

2142.0
288.0
78.0
72.0
30.0
131.0

83.43
82.64
76.92
72.22
66.67
54.96

In the multiple condition analysis, we considered all diagnoses of a patient as a single complex category.
That allowed us to assess the identification rates for patients suffering from a particular combination of
conditions. The identification rate results for all joint conditions with more than one hundred samples are
shown Table 12. The identification accuracy per all single conditions is shown in Table 11. Table 15
shows the full diagnosis names for the condition codes used in Table 11 and Table 12. Based on Table
11, some single conditions, such as ventricular fibrillation, sinus arrest, left bundle branch block,
myocardial infarction, and premature ventricular contractions had low identification rates (respectively
54.96%,66.67%,83.43%, 85.14%,86.04%), while healthy sinus rhythm and conditions like shortened PR
interval, supraventricular tachycardia or counterclockwise vector cardiographic loop had high
identification rates (respectively 98.15%,100%,99.55%, 98.76%). Also based on the joint condition
analysis (Table 12), patients with both atrial fibrillation and complete right bundle branch block had a
very low identification rate (48.95%) making it almost impossible to identify these group of patients
based on their ECG. On the other hand, patients with both ST changes and supraventricular tachycardia
had a very high identification rate (99.7%), putting these group of patients in a very high-risk group
regarding privacy. One observation is that in contrast to the common expectation, some conditions like
patients with both ST changes and supraventricular tachycardia or patients diagnosed with sinus
tachycardia had even a better identification rate than normal sinus rhythm. Finally, for patients with
pacemakers, the identification rate was 91.11% in the joint list and 89.29% in the single disease analysis.
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Table 14 Identification rate considering joint conditions in 80k data model
Condition Name
STC SVT
STach
LVHV SB
STach TAb
SB
SB TAb
SNR
SNR TAb
SNR STC
STC STach
SA
STC
AFL
OldMI
InMI SNR
STD
AF TAb
CRBBB
IAVB
AF
AF STC
PVC
PR
PAC
STE
AF CRBBB

Number of
Validation
1003.0
9548.0
1979.0
1477.0
15009.0
1124.0
37277.0
2565.0
1282.0
2870.0
3524.0
7394.0
1230.0
2092.0
1843.0
4720.0
1908.0
7478.0
3160.0
10557.0
2294.0
4904.0
1136.0
2785.0
1196.0
1283.0

Heartbeats

in Identification rate (%)
99.7
99.53
99.34
99.26
99.05
99.02
98.88
98.83
98.52
98.5
98.07
97.57
97.48
97.32
96.69
96.69
96.65
96.47
95.28
93.57
93.5
92.48
91.11
90.59
83.03
48.95

5.5.2 Identification Rate Per Gender and Age
We also assessed the identification rates across genders and age groups for the 80k data model. There
were 2,996 patients with unknown gender and 649 with unknown age in data which were removed from
the related analysis. Table 15 and Figure 20 summarize our results. Our result show that males had a
slightly lower identification rate compared to females and older patients had a lower identification rate
compared to younger patients. Thus, this implies higher privacy risks for females or younger subjects.

49

Table 15 Identification rate per gender for the combined data model
Gender

Number of Samples

Identification Rate

male

120413

95.13%

female

104818

96.59%

Figure 20 Identification rate per age group for the 80k data model
We also performed similar analysis on the subset of patients with healthy normal sinus rhythms to
investigate the presence of differences in identification accuracies across genders or age groups among
healthy individuals. The results are shown in Table 16 and Figure 21. Again, male patients had a lower
identification rate compared to females, and older patients had lower identification rates than the younger
subjects.
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Figure 21 Identification rate per age group for sinus rhythms only

Table 16 Identification per gender for sinus rhythms only
Gender

Number of Samples

Identification Rate

male

15773

98.66%

female

20699

99.18%
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Table 17 Diagnosis codes mapping table
Diagnosis Code
SR
SRNORM
NORM
AAR
AF
AFL
AIVR
AJR
AMI
ATach
AVB
AVC
AVD
AVJR
AnMI
Atrial Escape Beat
Atrial Rhythm
BPAC
Brady
Brugada
CAVB
CCVCL
CLBBB
CRBBB
CVCL
ERe
FB
IAVB
IIAVB
IIAVBI
IIAVBII
ILBBB
IRBBB
InMI
Intraventricular Block
JE
JPC
JTach

Full Diagnosis Name
sinus rhythm
sinus normal rhythm
normal ECG
accelerated atrial rhythm
atrial fibrillation
atrial flutter
accelerated idioventricular rhythm
accelerated junctional rhythm
acute myocardial infarction
atrial tachycardia
av block
Aberrant Ventricular Conduction
auriculoventricular dissociation
atrioventricular junctional rhythm
anterior myocardial infarction
Atrial Escape Beat
Atrial Rhythm
blocked premature atrial contraction
bradycardia
Brugada
complete atrioventricular block
Counterclockwise vectorcardiographic
loop
complete left bundle branch block
complete right bundle branch block
Clockwise vectorcardiographic loop
early repolarization
fusion beats
1st degree av block
2nd degree av block
Mobitz type I second degree
atrioventricular block
Mobitz type II atrioventricular block
incomplete left bundle branch block
incomplete right bundle branch block
inferior myocardial infarction
Intraventricular Block
junctional escape
junctional premature complex
junctional tachycardia
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LAD
LAH
LAHV
LAnFB
LBBB
LMI
LPFB
LPR
LQRSV
LQT
LVH
LVHV
MI
PAC
PMI
PPW
PR
PRWP
PTW
PVC
PVT
PWC
QAb
RAD
RAH
RAHV
RAVC
RBBB
RRWP
RVH
SA
SAB
SARR
SB
SNR
SPRI
SPVB
SQT
STC
STD
STE
STach
SVT

left axis deviation
left atrial hypertrophy
Left atrial high voltage
left anterior fascicular block
left bundle branch block
lateral myocardial infarction
left posterior fascicular block
prolonged pr interval
low qrs voltages
prolonged qt interval
left ventricular hypertrophy
left ventricular high voltage
myocardial infarction
premature atrial contraction
Posterior myocardial infarction
Prolonged P wave
pacing rhythm
Poor R wave Progression
Prolonged T wave
premature ventricular contractions
paroxysmal ventricular tachycardia
P wave change
qwave abnormal
right axis deviation
right atrial hypertrophy
right atrial high voltage
retrograde atrioventricular conduction
right bundle branch block
reversed R wave progression
right ventricular hypertrophy
sinus arrhythmia
sinoatrial block
sinus arrest
sinus bradycardia
sinus rhythm
shortened pr interval
supraventricular premature beats
decreased qt interval
s t changes
st depression
st elevation
sinus tachycardia
supraventricular tachycardia
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TAb
TInv
TPW
TTW
UAb
VEsB
VEsR
VF
VFL
WPW
OldMI

t wave abnormal
t wave inversion
Tall P wave
Tall tented T wave
u wave abnormal
ventricular escape beat
ventricular escape rhythm
ventricular fibrillation
ventricular flutter
wolff parkinson white pattern
old myocardial infarction

54

6 Assessing the Privacy Risks
The application of ECG as a biometric can be a useful technology, but it also raises serious concerns
regarding the potential privacy leakages. For example, an ECG-based biometrics system can also
diagnose and store heart conditions of the users without the patient's consent. Privacy protection becomes
even more critical as we collect and store a constantly increasing volume of data from the citizens. For
example, the emerging medical wearable device technologies capture and store a continuous stream of
sensitive health data. In the previous chapter, we designed and implemented a deep learning model
capable of identifying subjects based on 12-lead ECG data. Previous results had severe limitations due to
limited sample sizes ranging from a couple of dozen to approximately one thousand subjects. In this study
we trained a model with the largest number of subjects - 80,746. We attained an exceptionally high overall
accuracy of 95.69%. In the following subsections, we discuss the implications of our findings for the
privacy of patients.

6.1

Re-identification Risks Due to ECG Identification

ECG identification algorithms create the potential for re-identification of individuals in ECG databases.
Re-identification is the practice of discovering the identity of individuals in an anonymized database by
matching the records with publicly available information (auxiliary data). There is an incorrect historical
belief that anonymizing data obtained by removing identifiers from a dataset protects the privacy of
subjects. There have been many instances of re-identification of individuals in anonymized research
datasets. For example, in 1997, a researcher from MIT re-identified the governor of Massachusetts in an
anonymized research healthcare dataset by matching this data with the publicly available voter
registration data [26].
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A potential re-identification scenario in ECG datasets could occur when an individual contributes data to
two or more different research datasets. For example, database A has ECG sample, gender, and date of
birth, while database B has an ECG sample and zip code. By simply matching the ECG columns in both
databases using an identification system, one can discover the individuals that appear in both datasets and
obtain a complete profile of the individual by joining their records. In this case, we have gender and date
of birth from database A and zip code from database B. These three demographics attributes might be
enough to uniquely identify someone as 87% of US citizens can be uniquely identified only by having
their date of birth, gender and zip code [62] [63]. While each of these demographics (quasi-identifiers)
alone are not enough to identify someone, their combination can be unique for a considerable percentage
of the population. Table 18 shows how different combinations of quasi-identifiers like gender, birth date,
age, and race can uniquely identify citizens of the United States [62]. The table reports average numbers
across United States; however, some specific geographic regions have much higher uniqueness rates for
these identifiers. Additionally, rare scenarios such as patients over 90 years old, or a very small population
of an ethnic/race group living in a zip code can make them more vulnerable to re-identification attacks.
Table 18 Uniqueness of US Population (Sweeney 2000 [62])
identifiers

Uniqueness

age, gender, 5-digit ZIP

0.04%

gender, date of birth, ZIP

87.1%

gender, date of birth, county

18.1%

place, gender, 2year age range

0.01%

county, gender, Year of birth

0.00004%
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For example, consider the scenario where a patient diagnosed with both ST changes and supraventricular
tachycardia contributes to two different research datasets. Both datasets are fully anonymized, one of
them contains an ECG sample, age, and gender and the other one contains an ECG sample and zip code.
If we join these two datasets, we can find the subjects who appear in both, giving us age, gender, and zip
code for the patients who appear in both. The uniqueness for this combination in the United States is
0.04%. We also know that the average identification rate for patients diagnosed with both ST changes
and supraventricular tachycardia is 0.997. Multiplying these two numbers (under independence) will give
us the probability of identifying this patient uniquely and correctly: 0.997 × 0.0004 ≈ 0.0004. Now, if we
have birth date instead of age, then this probability increases to: 0.997×0.871 ≈ 0.8684.

6.2

Re-identification Risks Due to ECG-Based Demographics Predication

A limited research has been gone into predicting demographics such as age, gender, and race from ECG
signals. Attia et al [64] trained a CNN to predict age and sex on 10-second samples of 12-lead ECG
signals from 499,727 patients. They achieved an accuracy of 90.4% for gender classification and an
average error of 6.9±5.6 years for age estimation on a separate validation set of 275,056 patients. Wiggins
et al [65] presented a genetically evolved Bayesian classifier for age detection capable of assigning
patients into young and elderly groups with an AUC of 86.25%. Noseworthy et al [66] built neural
network models to discern racial subgroups including African American, Caucasian non-Hispanic,
Hispanic/Latino, Asian, and American/Indian or Alaskan Native with an accuracy of 56.2%. Cabra et al
[67] reported 94% accuracy on classifying gender. Khan et al [68] trained a gender classification model
with an accuracy of 95.2%.
Relying on the above reports regarding ECG-based demographics detection, we assume that we can
extract the age and gender of the patient from the sample with high accuracies. We also assume that
patients live in the proximity of the hospital or clinic where their ECG was captured. Consequently, if we
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know the hospital where the ECG sample was recorded, we can predict the patient's zip code. The
combination of these three elements (age, gender, zip code) might be enough to fully identify the patient
and locate their residence via online databases and auxiliary public database searches.
Even though, we cannot estimate the exact value for the birth date (year, month, and day) based on ECG
deep learning analysis, we can estimate the age. If our database has the date for capturing the ECG from
the patient, we can reference the value of age to that date and calculate the value for the year of birth.
Year of birth is 365 times less identifiable than an exact date of birth, but it is more informative in terms
of uniqueness than age. Additionally, race might also be detectable from an ECG sample, which can
significantly narrow down the search for the patient.

6.3

Implications for the Privacy Laws

There are different opinions on criminalization of wrongful re-identification. Some advocates of reidentification criminalization believe that doing so will eventually have a great impact on health and
medical discoveries through Big Data analysis since clear laws and regulations will ease the data
collection and analysis [69] [70] [71]. There are also opponents, who believe that less restrictions in data
sharing will revolutionize medical research [72].
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA or the Kennedy–Kassebaum Act) of
1996 is a United States federal statute which establishes regulatory thresholds regarding data from health
records to protect all individually identifiable health information from patients. Similarly, in the European
Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a data protection and privacy regulation that
sets guidelines for the collection and processing of all types of personal information (including medical
and healthcare) for the citizens. It gives individuals control over their personal data. For instance, GDPR-
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compliant pseudonymization is a set of guidelines to reduce the privacy risks by assuring that data cannot
be attributed to a specific subject without the use of separately kept additional information.
The HIPAA Safe Harbor standard states that a dataset derived from health records should not contain any
of the 18 HIPAA identifiers in order to be considered as de-identified [25]. Table 6 lists the 18 identifiers
stated by HIPAA. Some of these identifiers are explicit such as address, phone number, or email which
could be used to directly contact the patient [62]. Even though identifier number 16 is for biometric
identifiers, but ECG is not explicitly mentioned. In addition to be a biometric identifier, ECG can also
potentially reveal other information about patients like age, gender, race, and health conditions. As shown
in the previous subsections, this information can be used to identify the person and even find their explicit
identifiers like address, phone number, and name which are HIPAA identifiers 1,2, and 4. Benitez and
Malin estimated the percentage of a state's population to be vulnerable to unique re-identification attacks
even when Safe Harbor is applied, ranges from 0.01% to 0.25% [73]. The findings from our research
indicates that ECG is a more sensitive health information than previously thought and requires more
attention from privacy perspective. The results from our research suggests that ECG should be added to
the list of HIPAA identifiers as the HIPPA 19th identifier or otherwise it should be clearly mentioned as
part of the identifier sixteen.
HIPAA also has regulations regarding the right to access your PHI (Protected Healthcare Information)
including health condition, treatment plan, notes, images, lab results, and billing information. Likewise,
the European GDPR also defines the right of access to their personal data and information for subjects.
In order to comply to GDPR, the data collector must provide a copy of the actual data upon the subject
request, i.e., what we have stored about you.
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However, data access rights become tricky when it comes to a data such as ECG, based on which other
information such as age, gender, and diseases can be extracted on the fly. While a single ECG sample
without any other data related to it, seems to be harmless with respect to the owner's privacy, it can reveal
sensitive derivative information about its owner. In this case, we recommend that in addition to the right
to access the actual copy of data, data collectors must also provide the subject with enough information
on the potential of data privacy infringement associated with that piece of data. For instance, organizations
collecting ECG data could provide enough information to the patients regarding the potential derivative
data like age, gender, race, heart conditions, life habits (like smoking, level of alcohol consumption) and
etc.
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7 Application of Differential Privacy to
Arrhythmia Analysis
Even a short ECG recording can be used as a unique identifier of the subject. Further, sensitive
information such as heart diseases, gender, race, and age can also be obtained from analyses of these data.
Additionally, the emerging medical wearable devices technologies make the privacy requirements in the
analysis of such data even more critical. Medical wearable devices capture a continuous stream of signals
and measurements from our bodies, which will open vast opportunities in research, monitoring,
prevention, and diagnosis of diseases in the near future. For instance, Apple recently released Apple
Watch series 6 capable of capturing a single lead ECG. Both the sensitivity of ECG data in terms of the
personal information that it can reveal about its owner and also the fact that we are amassing huge amounts
of ECG data coming from the wearable sensors, makes privacy safeguards in collection and analysis of
such data critical.
Differential privacy has become the preeminent technique to protect the privacy of individuals in a
database while allowing the results from data analysis to be shared. The most important characteristics of
this technique is that it puts a guarantee on the amount of privacy loss in the worst-case scenario. In a
differentially private query release task, we want to safely publish approximate noisy answers to a set of
queries on a database, while both satisfying the constraints of differential privacy and maximizing the
utility (accuracy of analysis).
Even though, many theoretical research papers have been published, practical real-life application of
differential privacy demands addressing several important points. For instance, identifying the value of
the key parameter in differential privacy (ε) that controls the trade-off between the accuracy of the results
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and the privacy loss. This parameter determines the required amount of additive noise in differentially
private mechanisms, which work by perturbing the analysis results to protect the privacy. However, how
to choose the value of ε is a critically important question without any clear answers. Additionally, how to
split this total privacy budget across the queries can be tricky in practice. Apart from ε, in order to specify
the amount of noise in mechanisms, like Laplace, the sensitivity of functions (the maximum amount of
change in the response of a function due to the addition of a single record) is also being used. Estimating
sensitivity for a general function itself can be a hard task. Basic definitions and concepts in differential
privacy are discussed in Chapter 3.
In this chapter, we explore how to implement differential privacy on an arrhythmia database to produce
shareable results that also ensure the privacy of all subjects. We provide guidelines for all steps of the
query release such as selection of the ε value, distribution of the total ε budget across the queries and
estimation of sensitivity. The data used in this chapter for the case study is openly available at
https://figshare.com/collections/ChapmanECG/456049 [47]. The Code for the analysis done this chapter
is openly available at https://github.com/arin-gzn/differential-privacy-arrhythmia-analysis.

7.1

Differential Privacy Implementations

In the recent years, in parallel with the theoretical developments in differential privacy, tools have been
developed for real-life deployment of differentially private systems. For example, Google has developed
an open-source library (https://github.com/google/differential-privacy) to generate ε- and (ε, δ)differentially private statistics over datasets with interfaces for Java, Go, and C++ programming
languages. It assumes that each user contributes only a fixed number of rows to each partition and that
number is configurable by the user (the number of times a user appears in a database or maximum number
of contributions each user can make to a single aggregation). The core library supports differentially
private operations like sum, mean, count, variance, standard deviation, min, max, and median.
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Additionally, it supports implementations of the general Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms, which can
be used to make any given function differentially private. It also includes a sql engine on top of it to easily
perform differentially private analysis on top of tabular data. Privacy on Beam is an end-to-end
differential privacy framework in Google's differential privacy library, which is built on top of Apache
Beam, making it possible to run differentially private queries at scale and in parallel. Another useful tool
included in Google DP project is DP Stochastic Tester, which checks if a given algorithm holds the
differential privacy predicate over a set of databases.
Diffpriv [74] (https://github.com/brubinstein/diffpriv) is an R library for differential privacy, supporting
implementations of generic differential privacy mechanisms, including Laplace, Gaussian, exponential,
and Bernstein [75] [75]. Another open-source differential privacy library is SmartNoise/OpenDP
(https://github.com/opendp) jointly developed by Microsoft and Harvard. The SmartNoise system
includes differentially private algorithms, as well as support for connecting to popular sql engines. It also
has tools to produce differentially private synthetic dataset generated from a statistical model based on
the original dataset. A synthetic dataset produced this way can be analyzed any number of times without
increasing the privacy risk. IBM has a differential privacy python library called Diffprivlib
(https://github.com/IBM/differential-privacy-library). In addition to basic differentially private functions
like histogram and mean, it comes with a set of differentially private models including linear regression,
logistic regression, k-means, naive Bayes, and PCA. In this paper, we use IBM's library to implement the
differentially private release of some queries on an ECG dataset.
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7.2

Publishing a Differentially Private Analysis

Query release is the problem of releasing accurate answers to a set of statistical queries in a privacy
preserving setting. Many query release algorithms work by generating synthetic data: an
approximate/perturbed version of the original database that works on every statistical query of interest.
Often time, these methods are computationally expensive and intractable. Another method is to just
publish the results of some queries and not the database itself.
We will use the 10k open ECG dataset introduced in Chapter 4 for our case study, Figure 22 shows sample
rows from this dataset. In the coming subsections, we will discuss different steps involved in releasing
differentially private query results on a dataset as shown in Figure 23. Table 19 provides the definition of
columns in the dataset. Assume, we want to publish a differentially private report on the effect of
arrhythmias on the QRS duration. Since we have ten type of arrhythmias in our dataset plus the sinus
healthy rhythm, we will publish eleven numbers (average QRS duration for each of the eleven labels).

Figure 22 Sample records from the dataset
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Table 19 Dataset Columns Definition
Attribute
Rhythm
Beat
PatientAge
Gender
VentricularRate
AtrialRate
QRSDuration
QTInterval
QTCorrected
RAxis
TAxis
QRSCount
QOnset
QOffset

Description
Rhythm Label
Other conditions Label
Age
Gender (Male/Female)
Ventricular rate in BPM
Atrial rate in BPM
QRS duration in millisecond
T interval in millisecond
Q Corrected QT interval in millisecond
R axis
T axis
QRS count
Q onset (In samples)
Q offset (In samples)

Figure 23 - Steps in a differential privacy query release
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7.2.1 Choosing the Differential Privacy Type
As we explained in the Background section, there are two versions of differential privacy depending on
if δ parameter is set to zero (pure differential privacy) or not (approximate differential privacy). In case,
one picks the approximate differential privacy version, then the value of δ should be less than the inverse
of any polynomial in the size of the database. The chances of privacy leak increase with the size of the
database, thus a value less than the inverse of the size of database should be chosen for δ. There is also a
(ε, δ,γ)-random differential privacy in which, it relaxes the original differential privacy constraint such
that adding a randomly drawn new observation to a database will have small effect on the output [76]
(differential privacy requires that adding any new observation to a database will have small effect on the
output of the data-release procedure). Considering the sensitivity of medical data, we will choose a pure
ε differential privacy to have a full guarantee on the privacy loss for our ECG analysis case.

7.2.2 Choosing ε
Despite the vast literature in differential privacy, there has been less attention to the important question
of choosing a proper value for the ε. Dwork mentions that choosing ε is a social question [37]. Lee and
Clifton [77] have used a Bayesian approach to find an upper bound for the value of ε based on how much
the posterior belief regarding an individual's participation in a database is updated. They have explored
the problem of choosing an optimal ε from an adversarial model point of view. Naldi and D'Acquisto [78]
propose to use confidence level and interval instead of ε because they are more intuitive and easier to
understand. These two parameters tell us the probability (confidence level) that the result is within a given
range (confidence interval). In other words, the ε is chosen to meet the desired level for accuracy. The
authors have provided the formulas to convert these two parameters to ε for counting queries. In [79], the
authors promote incorporating societal preferences in choosing ε based on the privacy preferences of the
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data contributors. In their approach (called epsilon voting), each data contributor expresses their desired
value for ε, and a chooser mechanism aggregates all of the users’ preferences into a single final value.
In addition to academic environments, differential privacy has also gained attention in industry.
Companies like Google, Apple, and Microsoft are using differentially private mechanism for collecting
and analyzing their users' data. For instance, Apple's iOS apps add random noise to personal data like
emoji usage or HealthKit data before storing it for aggregate analysis purposes. By reverse-engineering
the iOS apps, researchers were able to find how these apps implement differential privacy and what
specific values of ε has been used. Based on their research, values such as 6, 14, and even 43 were used
which are not considered to be safe (values below one are usually considered as safe) [80]. Google has
also started using differentially private algorithms for its data collection and analysis, for instance chrome
has a differential privacy system called RAPPOR (Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal
Response). They have used an ε value of two on average and an upper limit of 8 or 9 over the lifetime of
the user [81]. Both Apple and Google have used local differential privacy in their products. Local
differential privacy takes a single user's records and generates the response, in contrast to regular
differential privacy in which the algorithm generates the output on top of all the records in the dataset.
This implies that if an adversary has access to the individual level responses from a database, still will
not be able to learn too much about each user in local differential privacy mode. Table 20 summarizes
some of the values used for ε in different academic papers or software. In most cases, the values for ε
have been chosen without any justification or reasoning. To decide on the proper value for the ε we also
need to know the level of accuracy needed in that study. For example, what is the minimum amount of
accuracy needed to make a report useful for cardiologists.
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Table 20 Example epsilon values used in research and industry
Product/Research

Epsilon

Application area

Apple iOS

6,7, 14

HealthKit, emoji usage, browsing

Google Android RAPPOR

4

Client-sides statistics collection, chrome usage statistics

Microsoft Windows 10 [82]

0.1-1

Application usage statistics

Korolova et al. [83]

ln2, ln5, ln10

Click counts

Machanvajjhala et al. [84]]

0.5-3

Recommender system

Uhler et al.

0.1-0.4

Genome data

Cormode et al. [85]

0.1-1

Location data

Acs-Castellucia [86]

1

Smart electric meters

Bhasker et al. [87]

1.4

Frequent items

Hsu et al. [88] propose an economic method for choosing ε considering the interests of two parties: the
data analyst and the prospective participants in a database. These two parties have conflicting interests:
On one hand, the data analyst is concerned about the accuracy of the analysis results; on the other hand,
the participants are concerned only about the risk of participation (harm due to potential privacy leakage)
vs. the monetary benefits. They have considered a scenario where participants are being monetarily
compensated for contributing their data, and participants are rational, i.e., they will agree to contribute
their private data if the expected benefits outweigh the risks of bad events (privacy leakage). The authors
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argue that ε is not enough to model the real-world complexities of conducting a study, instead they
propose using four parameters from which ε can be calculated. These four parameters are α (accuracy
level), AM(ε,N) (measure of accuracy), B (budget), and E (individual’s expected cost if they do not
participate in a study). After plugging in these parameters into their models, it tells you if an experiment
is feasible or not and if yes what is the optimal ε value. We applied the economic method proposed by
Hsu et al. to find a sample value for the ε in arrhythmia research [88]. In order to calculate participants’
belief (Ef eas ≥ E) about the cost if they do not participate in a study, we use the general statistics and
costs related to health data breach in United States. The average cost of a healthcare breach in United
States in 2019 is reported to be $429 [89]. The chances of an individual being affected by a medical data
breach have been relatively high in the past decade. On average each year 23.5 million American residents
have been affected by a health data breach in the past ten years [90]. We divided this number by the total
population to estimate the average chance of a medical data leakage per person in United States (roughly
8%). Therefore, we can calculate the base cost to be E = 08×29 ≈ 34 (expected monetary loss for each
individual due to medical record leakage from another source outside of our experiment). We also assume
that we have $10000 budget (B) for this experiment, and the analyst needs 98% confidence (α = 0.02)
that the results will have 8% additive error (±.08 accuracy, T = 0.08). Plugging in these values into Hsu
et al’s27 Equations tells us that this experiment is feasible and then we need greater than 9395 participants,
with 0.0133 as the optimal value for ε. We realized that this ε value is low to answer all of our eleven
queries with acceptable accuracy and instead we adopted a value of 0.11.

7.2.3 Distributing ε
In a scenario where we have multiple queries, a total budget for ε needs to be allocated and distributed
across all queries. Techniques exist which can improve the accuracy of the analysis once you know the
queries ahead of time, allowing more queries per a given ε budget [91] [92] [93]. Dwork et al presented
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a mechanism that is (ε,δ)-differentially private with a running time polynomial in |R| and k [93] . The
mechanism’s utility is better than the independent Laplace mechanism, and for fixed usefulness
parameters, the privacy parameter ε grows linearly with O(n2log2k). This technique only applies to the
non- adaptive case, where the queries are known ahead of time. Also, in [91] [92] the authors proposed a
method to reduce noise when all queries are known in advance. A simple rule to manually distribute the
privacy budget among some queries is to break down the budget based on the priority of queries in terms
of the utility. We assign more budget to queries which we need more accurate result for. For our ECG
Query release example, we assigned it equally across all arrhythmia types, so that 0.01 privacy budget is
allocated for each query.

7.2.4 Estimating the Global Sensitivity
Estimating a global sensitivity for a given general function f can be challenging. When it comes to ECG
measurements, the global sensitivity can be the maximum change in the value of a function like mean on
an ECG measurement variable like QRS duration, when any subject (from around seven billion human
population) is added/removed from/to a dataset. Nissim et al [94] introduced the smooth sensitivity
technique which works by estimating an upper bound on the local sensitivity, using a smooth function.
This helps to reduce the amount of noise added, since the local sensitivity is often much smaller than the
global sensitivity. Local sensitivity is defined as the maximum change in the result of applying a given
function in the neighborhood of an instance database. For basic statistics like mean queries or histograms,
most differential privacy libraries like Google differential privacy, Diffprivlib, or Smartnoise require the
range/bounds of values for variables to be specified, which is used to estimate the sensitivity. IBM’s
Diffprivlib requires you to set the sensitivity manually when the general differential privacy mechanisms
like Laplace are being used directly. The diffpriv R library uses sensitivity sampling technique in place
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of theoretical sensitivity analysis to achieve a (ε, δ,γ)-random differential privacy [76]. The sensitivity
sampler requires that a sampling distribution to be provided.

Figure 24 Gender distribution in the dataset
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Figure 25 Distribution of age in the dataset

Figure 26 Distribution of arrhythmias in the dataset
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Figure 27 Distribution of ECG measurement variables in the dataset
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Age and gender are two common fields seen in most cardiology datasets. As seen in Figure 24 and
Figure 25, gender has roughly a uniform distribution between male and female and age resembles
a left-skewed distribution (arrhythmia is less common among younger people). Figure 26 shows
the distribution of different types of arrhythmia among the patients (refer to Table 9 for a definition
of the arrhythmia types). As shown, some form of arrhythmia is rare, for instance SAAWR (Sinus
Atrium to Atrial Wandering Rhythm) is far less frequent than other conditions. In the presence of
rare diseases in a dataset, a large amount of noise needs to be added to the results of analysis in
order to protect the privacy of the participants, significantly decreasing the accuracy of the analysis
results. For features related to the PQRST wave, different distributions with different Kurtosis are
seen as depicted in Figure 27: skewed (e.g., Atrial rate), right-skewed (e.g., QOffset), left-skewed
(e.g., RAxis), or a close to normal distribution (e.g., QTInterval). From a differential privacy point
of view, these different distributions of fields can make them a good or bad candidate for different
types of queries by affecting the sensitivity. Skewed data might make the sensitivity very large for
some types of queries like mean; therefore, the amount of noise added can be very large reducing
the accuracy of the response. Even though the case for normal distributions is better than the
skewed data, still it can distort the results of mean function noticeably. In general, the long tails in
the distribution of variables can significantly reduce the utility of analysis. For the mean function,
the sensitivity also depends on the size of the database: The larger the number of the participants
in the database, the smaller the amount of required additive noise. However, the case for count and
histogram queries is better since the global sensitivity is always one and independent of the dataset.
Especially when we have a large number of users, count or histogram queries can be published
with a high utility while still ensuring the worst-case scenario privacy loss amount. For instance,
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Figure 28 shows the differentially private histogram of distribution of variables in our dataset. As
you can see these are very similar to the actual histogram shown in Figure 27.

Figure 28 Differentially private distribution of variables in the dataset. An ε value of 0.01
is used for each histogram
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7.2.5 Releasing Queries
Table 21 shows the results of our differentially private query releases. We have shown the results
from two runs to show how the results are different across execution of the queries due to the
randomness in the process of adding noise. One observation is that for less frequent conditions like
Atrioventricular Node Reentrant Tachycardia in our dataset, the differentially privacy library has
returned 18 or 256. The reason is that since the sensitivity of a mean function has an inverse
relationship with the number of subjects, the amount of noise added to the results for the less
frequent categories is very large. This has led to numbers outside of the range for the average QRS
duration (the range for QRS duration in our dataset is 18-256). Most differential privacy libraries
clip the numbers which are outside of the range to the minimum or maximum value. This implies
that one cannot publish a report with acceptable accuracy on rare conditions. Although the ε can
be published as part of the differentially private report, one cannot report both the accuracy and ε
since reporting both will compromise the privacy of analysis [95].
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Table 21 Differentially private query release results for the average length of QRS
duration per arrhythmia vs the actual values. Epsilon budget per query is 0.01
Arrhythmia

Actual

Differential Privacy Run 1

Differential Privacy Run 2

Sinus Rhythm

87.0043

74.4447

62.4114

Sinus Bradycardia

93.3180

103.5866

94.9718

Atrial Fibrillation

92.7808

90.8266

85.0498

Sinus Tachycardia

85.2767

83.7752

46.4069

Atrial Flutter

97.2988

106.3036

56.5624

Sinus Irregularity

87.4536

18.0

77.0918

Supraventricular Tachycardia

96.0545

18.0

118.3356

Atrial Tachycardia

88.9586

18.0

225.1247

89.875

18.0

18.0

Atrioventricular Reentrant Tachycardia

81.5

256.0

18.0

Sinus Atrium to Atrial Wandering Rhythm

84.8571

256.0

256.0

Atrioventricular

Node

Reentrant

Tachycardia
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7.3

Training Differentially Private Classifiers

Differential privacy concept has been applied to machine learning techniques to be able to train
and share models with privacy guarantee. However, in their current state, most of them require
very large values for the privacy budget in order to provide an acceptable utility [96]. For instance,
one popular method to incorporate differential privacy in the learning process is the gradient
perturbation where we add noise to the results of the gradient of loss function at each iteration of
the algorithm. We trained differentially private naive bayes classifiers on our ECG dataset to
classify records into eleven groups of arrhythmias specified at Table 9. We used the same dataset
of 10646 patients, using 20% of records for the test set and the rest for training. The accuracy
achieved for the regular (non-differentially private) classifier is 75.12%. Figure 29 shows the
accuracy achieved across different ε values for the differentially private naïve Bayes classifier. As
the ε is increasing, the accuracy gets closer to the regular non-differentially private.

Figure 29 Accuracy of Naive Bayes classifier across a range of different ε values
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7.4

Challenges and Conclusion

Although, it has a strong theoretical foundation, differential privacy has many unaddressed
questions regarding how to estimate its parameter values such as ε and global sensitivity.
Additionally, an acceptable privacy guarantee requires a large loss in the utility, making the final
deferentially private results or models useless in practice. Since the results published from an
analysis might be used by a physician to diagnose patients, this imposes an additional requirement
on the improved utility of differentially private analysis in medical research. Also, applying
differential privacy for the analysis of rare diseases in a dataset might not be practical, since it
requires a large amount of noise to protect the privacy of these individuals, making the final
published results useless. In our experience, at its current state, an analyst should distinguish
between what is publishable deferentially private vs what they would like to publish in an ideal
world. For example, it can be practical for some types of reports like count or histogram queries
with a large number of subjects in a non-interactive mode. New and better techniques are required
to be developed for a more wide-spread application to cardiology and in general medical research.
Another challenge is the complexity of the notion of ε for the end-users of the report. On the other
hand, ε is not a familiar concept for most people, making the interpretation of the shared results
difficult in terms of reliability. Additionally, ε is also a new notion for the judicial system, making
the judgment hard in case of lawsuits against a data leakage caused by a differentially private
research. One more critique to differential privacy is its vulnerability to data correlation. For
instance, this can happen in medical datasets where multiple members of a family, who share
genes, exist. Many diseases such as heart conditions have genetics and hereditary factors, running
among individuals in the same family. The recent open-source implementations of differential
privacy in popular languages like python, R, SQL opens the door for the community to apply this
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technique to real-world data and applications. This will provide a great feedback to the researchers
in terms of the areas to improve in order to make differential privacy applicable and useful in
practice.
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